Thank you to all of our panellists for participating, the audience members who submitted questions, and the following Backbench team members for their hard work: Orlaith (Admin-Outreach), Niamh (Communications), Leda (Communications), and Alex, Kasvee, Mia, Jade, and Ting Ting (Writing and Research).

Backbench Podcast is a subsidiary of the Edinburgh Political Union (EPU). All views expressed are our own.

Find us on Instagram and Spotify: @backbenchpodcast

We can’t wait for you to hear this detailed, diverse, and often entertaining conversation all about the upcoming US midterms: what we’re watching out for, how the results might look, and even their implications for the Presidential election cycle in 2028…

📢 Both teams prepared additional materials to introduce our listeners to midterm elections (and why they’re so important) which you can access here:

• Your election primer from the Dems team:

  Backbench Podcast

  2026 US Midterms

  Image Credit: Vor News…

  Read more

  3 months ago · The Backbench

• What to read this week to get acquainted with the US midterms, from us here at Backbench:

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We’d like to thank: Professor Carman for his time and insightful answers to our (big) questions; our attendees, especially the audience members who asked their own burning questions; the Democrats Overseas team for their contributions to planning the event, especially Alex Daniels (Co-President) and Anna Bronwyn Turney (Campaigns Officer); and finally, Backbench team members for all their hard work to put this event together.

For this episode:

• Guest: Professor Christopher Carman, Stevenson Professor of Citizenship at the University of Glasgow

• Co-Hosts: Rachel Barlow and Alex Daniels

• Mic Runner: Joe Hughes

• Communications Manager: Niamh Werner

• Audio Engineer: Jamie Calder

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Subscribe here, or follow us on Instagram and Spotify @backbenchpodcast to stay updated and hear about new episodes first! 🌟🎧

Plus, keep your eye out for tickets to our LIVE Question Time episode, the place to hear from YOUR student parties about the issues most important to you! It’ll be themed around the upcoming Scottish elections, so get questions in while you can 🎙️

Question submissions: https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSctWxWeQpAIvj7FfmYESJkBnyIpX3EF3hDg9etY9RrV2hpf8g/viewform?usp=sharing&ouid=103112132280998864401

Since its 1960 independence from France, Madagascar has experienced multiple crises of government overthrow and/or mass protests due to poor living conditions and endemic corruption. Madagascar is very poor, with the fifth-lowest GDP per capita in the world–which is actually substantially lower than it was when Madagascar gained independence. This is despite President Andry Rajoelina’s promises to increase wages and reduce poverty. Madagascar offers very few prospects to its population, which has a median age of 20. Almost 70% of Malagasy citizens live on less than $3 per day, while the small elite is immensely wealthy. Regardless of all this, Rajoelina was controversially re-elected in 2023 amidst an opposition boycott. However, a number of youth-led protest movements have overthrown previously stable regimes in the last couple of years as Gen Z utilises technology and social media for coordination to unify around one message: enough is enough. That’s exactly what unfolded in Madagascar last month.

The protest’s start was in September 2025, when two city councillors of Antananarivo (Madagascar’s capital) were arrested for trying to organise a protest against water and electricity outages. This led to the creation of a leaderless group, Gen Z Madagascar, on Facebook, Instagram, Discord, and Signal, taking direct inspiration from other anti-corruption

Gen Z movements such as those in Bangladesh, Nepal, Indonesia, Kenya, Morocco, and Serbia. Demonstrations erupted across Madagascar in late September over widespread power and water outages, government failures that fuelled outrage pushing political mistrust to its limit. These protests then escalated from water and power cuts towards a complete overhaul of the political system as thousands of young protesters took to the streets of Antananarivo, holding up their phone flashlights and protesting Madagascar’s corrupt institutions and extreme poverty.

Rather than resigning and paving the way for a smooth democratic transition, Rajoelina clung to power by dissolving his government and holding dialogues with different groups, but this was not enough to satisfy the protestors. Over the weekend of 11-12 October, Rajoelina warned an illegal attempt to seize power was underway as his elite CAPSAT military unit, which helped bring him to power in a 2009 coup, joined the protestors in the centre of Antananarivo. Rajoelina fled the country the next day, after weeks of the Gen Z Madagascar-led protests. In doing so, he abandoned the presidency in the same way as his predecessor, reportedly aboard a French plane to Dubai. The resulting power vacuum allowed Colonel Michael Randrianirina to declare on 14 October that the military had taken power, dissolving all institutions except the lower house of parliament, which had voted to impeach Rajoelina for desertion of duty due to his flight from the country. The African Union (AU) suspended Madagascar with immediate effect following the military coup, stating the rule of law must triumph over the rule of force.

Because Gen Z Madagascar is decentralised and does not have a strong leader or comprehensive ideology, it could dissipate rapidly now that Rajoelina has departed, even though Randrianirina may represent a mere pivot to a different elitist autocrat. It remains to be seen how much patience Gen Z Madagascar and the Malagasy youth in general will allow Randriarina, but many Malagasy currently seem inclined to give their country’s new leader the benefit of the doubt, cheering on Rajoelina’s departure with cautious optimism towards the future. For his part, Randrianirina has already announced an investigation into Jirama, the state-owned water and power company; appointed Herintsalama Rajaonarivelo, a businessman and consultant, as Madagascar’s new Prime Minister; and promised to hold elections in the next 2 years. Again, it remains to be seen whether or not this promise will be upheld, as several other former French colonies in sub-Saharan Africa have recently undergone military coups in which generals initially promised to hold elections only to extend their own terms, such as Mali’s Assimi Goïta and Burkina Faso’s Ibrahim Traoré.

Madagascar’s youth-led protest movement was inspired by the crises it saw in social media. This is the first of two trends the recent events of Madagascar exemplifies: the international rise of self-styled Gen Z protests, as has been mobilised in the last couple of years by young people in Nepal, Morocco, Kenya, Peru, Bangladesh, Indonesia, and more. These protests are all oriented in technology and led by members of Gen Z, those born between the mid-1990s and early 2010s. Malagasy activists joined the Nepali Gen Z discord group to garner protest tips, while Gen Z Madagascar adopted the skull and crossbones flag from Japanese anime series One Piece, which has been flown in youth-led protests in Indonesia and the Philippines in August and September.

The second theme here is that of recent African military coups. The 2020s are only halfway over but have already seen ten African coups including Madagascar, which marks more than the entirety of the 2000s or the 2010s. Madagascar joins Niger (2023), Gabon (2023), Burkina Faso (2022), Mali (2021), and Guinea (2021) as the sixth former French colony in sub-Saharan Africa to experience a military coup in the last five years. However, this portrayal of recent events in Madagascar as a coup is contested. Rajoelina argues from exile that it was a sudden and unlawful seizure of power by a military officer, and that because he had won the most recent presidential elections in 2023, he is still the rightful President from abroad. The AU backs Rajoelina on this, but Randrianirina argues that in sacking his government, dissolving Parliament, and then fleeing the country, Rajoelina effectively vacated his office. Madagascar’s Constitutional Court concurs, as do most protestors. This debate matters because the AU has a zero-tolerance policy on coups, and many Western countries, including the US, have laws requiring them to immediately suspend aid after a coup. Like the states above, this may reflect a pivot in Madagascar’s foreign policy, away from France and towards Russia. Randrianirina attended a meeting with Russian embassy officials shortly after assuming the interim presidency–but as with everything else, we will simply have to wait and see.

Sources

• France 24

• The Economist

• The Guardian

• BBC

• Reuters

• CNN

Image Credit: Vor News

In the US, midterm elections are typically a check on the party in power. Coming halfway through a President’s 4-year term, the elections see every seat in the House of Representatives and a third of those in the Senate up for grabs, in addition to various other races at the state and local levels. The party in opposition usually makes substantial inroads as voters take out their frustrations on the party controlling the Presidency. As Republicans have had a ‘trifecta’ – that is, controlling all of the Presidency, the Senate, and the House of Representatives – since 2024, they have no excuse regarding broken campaign promises and will thus likely be punished for the increasing cost of living and the ongoing housing crisis. Many parallels will be drawn to the 2018 Midterms during Trump’s first term, which saw a significant ‘blue wave’ and presented a marked shift in public opinion against the first Trump administration. Democrats have real potential to flip the House, which would require claiming at least 23 seats from Republicans. Republicans are defending significantly more seats than Democrats which, paired with typical midterm trends and Trump’s historically low approval ratings, makes substantial Republican losses likely.

There are 33 regularly scheduled Senate elections and 2 special elections (to fill the former Senate seats of Vice President Vance and Secretary of State Rubio). A number of veteran seats are expected to be fiercely contested. Additionally, there are 36 gubernatorial elections, 15 of which have term-limited incumbents. The results of some of these races will dictate the playing field for the 2028 presidential primaries for both parties.

Seats to watch include:

- House: Rep. Thomas Massie (R-KY), Rep. Jared Golden (D-ME), Rep. Don Bacon (R-NE), and Rep. Mike Lawler (R-NY).

- Senate: Senator Susan Collins (R-ME), Senator Thom Tillis (R-NC), Senator Gary Peters (D-MI), and Senator John Cornyn (R-TX).

- Governorships: Arizona, California, Georgia, Iowa, Michigan, and Pennsylvania.

Shortlist of notable races:

The Texas Senate seat currently held by Sen. John Cornyn is being seriously contested in both party primaries. On the Republican side, State Attorney General Ken Paxton looks to be the frontrunner. He is a MAGA favourite and was endorsed by Turning Point USA but has also been plagued by scandal and, if nominated, would likely make the general election more difficult for Republicans to win because the four-time incumbent, Cornyn, is more palatable to the broader, non-MAGA population. This race will be heading to a runoff between the two Republican frontrunners. On the Democratic side, Rep. Jasmine Crockett and State Rep. James Talarico fought a very close fight for the nomination. The two have similar stances on policy, but vastly different styles: Rep. Crockett has appealed to more progressive voters and is known for insulting the Trump administration. Talarico has appealed to more moderate independents and Republicans and emphasised his experience as a Presbyterian seminarian, using his faith to oppose Republican policies such as displaying the Ten Commandments in Texan public schools. Today, Talarico was declared the winner, with 53% of the Democratic vote to Crockett’s 46%. The November race between Talarico and his Republican opponent will be one of the most expensive of the year for both parties. Read more on the Texas race here.

The North Carolina 4th Congressional District Democratic Primary reveals three interesting tensions: progressivism vs. moderation, the importance of Israel as a political issue, and the impact of pro-AI regulation group Public Action First. Incumbent Rep. Valerie Foushee is supported by North Carolina’s mainstream Democrats, including Governor Roy Cooper, but has been criticised for accepting donations from the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and Public Action First’s Anthropic. The challenger, county commissioner Nida Allam, is endorsed by Sen. Bernie Sanders and Leaders We Deserve, and is seen as the more progressive option. As of my writing this, Foushee leads Allam, but only by about 1,000 votes, and the race has not been called yet.

The Democratic Primary for the California gubernatorial race will have interesting indications for the Democratic Party’s plan in its most important stronghold. Democratic candidates include former Health and Human Services Secretary Xavier Becerra, former Rep. Katie Porter, billionaire and climate activist Tom Steyer, Rep. Eric Swalwell and former Los Angeles Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa. The crowded field represents a number of different avenues the Democratic Party could move towards. Additionally, term-limited Governor Gavin Newsom’s presidential ambitions will be influenced by the narrative he spins about his own state’s future.

Thank you for reading this primer on the 2026 US Midterms, and make sure to come along to our live event, ‘US Midterms: Trends and Toss-Ups’ with special guest Professor Christopher Carman from the University of Glasgow! The event is a collaboration between Backbench Podcast and Democrats Overseas, and will take place at Lister Learning Centre from 6-7pm on Friday, 6 March. Hope to see you all there!

Kind regards,

Alex Daniels and Anna Bronwyn Turney

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Backbench podcast is a subsidiary of the Edinburgh Political Union (EPU). All views expressed are our own.

Find us on Instagram and Spotify: @backbenchpodcast

As a little companion piece to episode 2, we wanted to share some important information about how you can make your voice heard. This post helps you determine if you’re eligible to vote, and what to do next.

For more information, go to: https://www.mygov.scot/voting-in-elections-in-scotland/register-to-vote

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Backbench podcast is a subsidiary of the Edinburgh Political Union (EPU). All views expressed are our own.

Find us on Instagram and Spotify: @backbenchpodcast

Check out our comprehensive Scottish elections primer here:

For more information, visit: https://www.mygov.scot/voting-in-elections-in-scotland/register-to-vote

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Backbench podcast is a subsidiary of the Edinburgh Political Union (EPU). All views expressed are our own.

Find us on Instagram and Spotify: @backbenchpodcast

Subscribe here on Substack for more content about registering to vote and the policy platforms of each party in the run-up to May 7th.

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The Backbench podcast is supported by the Edinburgh Political Union and The University of Edinburgh’s School of Social and Political Science.

As the Irish Ambassador to the US during the first Trump administration, the Irish Ambassador to the UK during Brexit, and the Irish Ambassador to Malaysia during the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, Daniel Mulhall possesses a poignant and uniquely qualified perspective. We at Backbench are grateful for the opportunity for such a distinguished figure to be our first guest on the podcast!

This live interview was conducted by Renee Phan and supported by Seb Illing and Josh Cheshire for the Q&A portion.

This podcast is made possible by our wonderful team, who have worked hard for the past six months to prepare and build our podcast for recording this semester.

• Exec Co-Producers: Finn Hughes and Renee Phan

• Co-Producers: David Wilson and Lucy Frewin

• Co-hosts: Seb Illing, Josh Cheshire, Renee Phan

• Writers/Researchers: Alex Daniels (lead), Maddie Schwarz, Rachel Barlow, Juliet Gartside, Laurie Glen, Kashvee Barjatya, Ting Ting Zhang

• Audio Engineer: Jamie Calder

• Production Assistant: Joe Hughes

• Outreach Secretary: Conor Ó Dochartaigh

• Communications Managers: Helise Helffer, Gabrielle Yurin

Supported by the Edinburgh Political Union and The University of Edinburgh’s School of Social and Political Science

We start off covering the UK, in which Laurie Glen researched Labour’s landslide victory and the rise of the far-right Reform UK before discussing the backlash against the Scottish National Party.

Next up is the US and Mexico, where Maddie Schwarz covers the historic victories of Donald Trump and Claudia Sheinbaum.

Kashvee Barjatya dove into the world’s largest election: India. Narendra Modi won re-election but was forced to form a coalition government, reflecting global anti-incumbency trends.

This is followed by Alex Daniels’ research on South Africa, in which Cyril Ramaphosa also lost his majority but retained his plurality. Then comes a piece on Botswana, in which the world’s longest streak of uninterrupted governance came to a brutal end.

Rachel Barlow covers the geopolitical tensions of Taiwan’s election, before we discuss Juliet Gartside’s research on the far-right and anti-incumbency trends of the EU elections, particularly France and Austria.

Then we wrap up with Ting Ting Zhang’s coverage on Georgia’s elections and the implications Russia’s electoral inference has on Georgia’s EU aspirations.

If you would like to read Rachel Barlow’s and Alex Daniels’ articles expanding on their commentary in this episode, please visit www.thebackbench.co.uk.

This podcast is made possible by our wonderful team, who have been hard at work for the past six months to prepare and build our podcast for recording this semester. The team is as follows:

• Producers

  • Exec Co-Producers: Finn Hughes and Renee Phan

  • Co-Producers: David Wilson and Lucy Frewin

• Co-Hosts

  • Seb Illing, Josh Cheshire, Renee Phan

• Writers/Researchers

  • Alex Daniels (lead), Maddie Schwarz, Rachel Barlow, Juliet Gartside, Laurie Glen, Kashvee Barjatya, Ting Ting Zhang

• Audio Engineer

  • Jamie Calder

• Production Assistant

  • Joe Hughes

• Outreach Secretary

  • Conor Ó Dochartaigh

• Communications Managers

  • Helise Helffer, Gabrielle Yurin

Supported by the Edinburgh Political Union and The University of Edinburgh’s School of Social and Political Science

As a writer and researcher for the Backbench Podcast, a student-run political podcast at the University of Edinburgh, I was recently tasked with researching an election or two from 2024. I chose to research the elections of South Africa and Botswana so I could compare and contrast the two as examples of long-dominant parties losing support, as is consistent with global themes of anti-incumbency and voter dissatisfaction throughout last year’s elections. In South Africa, the African National Congress [ANC] has ruled since South Africa’s liberation from apartheid in 1994. Meanwhile in Botswana, the Botswana Democratic Party [BDP] has ruled since Botswana’s independence from the UK in 1966. Until 2024, that is. Knowing both these parties suffered shock defeats after decades of unparalleled dominance, and that these are neighboring countries in southern Africa that are both former British colonies, I expected the 2024 elections of these two states to have a lot in common. But my primary surprise was that the similarities that appeared at surface level were all the similarities there really were; the two elections were far more distinct and nuanced than I had thought.

South Africa uses proportional representation to elect the 400 members of the National Assembly, with the leader of the majority party becoming President. The ANC’s vote share had decreased incrementally each election since the turn of the century, but in 2024 its vote share declined substantially, from 57% to 40%. See the table below.

For the first time since the fall of apartheid, in 2024, the ANC failed to secure a majority, throwing its future into doubt. However, because the party nonetheless retained a plurality of support, it was able to form a coalition agreement that would see ANC leader and incumbent President Cyril Ramaphosa retain his position for a second term. The ANC lost support primarily due to its failure to deliver services [such as low electricity supply leading to consistent blackouts], in addition to various corruption scandals. The ANC has historically been so popular because the majority of South Africans had been liberated by the party and thus felt they owed the party their vote. However, as more time progresses since 1994, a new generation of voters did not experience the horrors of apartheid and is thus not predisposed to vote ANC. All they have experienced is policy failures and corruption scandals, leading to rising voter dissatisfaction that culminated in the South African electorate determining last summer that the ANC could no longer be trusted to rule outright. As a result, the ANC formed a government of national unity with the DA and two smaller parties, which allowed Ramaphosa to retain his role as President.

The ANC was founded in 1912 to advocate for the rights of Black South Africans, and resisted apartheid and white minority rule through both political and military means until the end of apartheid in 1994. Today, the ANC is generally a catch-all party for those opposed to apartheid and racial discrimination, but is broadly centre-left and social democratic. In this way, the ANC is similar to the Scottish National Party, which is vaguely centre-left but upholds its foremost goal of Scottish independence above any socioeconomic partisan ideology.

Other parties include the Democratic Alliance [DA], uMkhonto we Sizwe [MK], and the Economic Freedom Fighters [EFF].

The DA is a centrist party that has finished in second place in each of the last five elections. The DA enjoys high levels of support from White South Africans and has been the most consistent party to successfully market itself as a safe alternative to the ANC. In 2024, the DA picked up 22% of the vote.

MK, whose name means Spear of the Nation in Zulu, is a populist party founded in December 2023, mere months before South Africa’s elections. MK copied the name and logo of the former armed wing of the ANC fighting against apartheid. The ANC sued MK over this- and lost- but that isn’t even the most controversial bit of MK’s rise. Jacob Zuma, a lifelong ANC member who served as the fourth President of South Africa from 2009-2018 [Ramaphosa succeeded him in 2018], campaigned with MK before becoming the leader of the newly established party, leading to his expulsion from the ANC for campaigning with a rival party. MK’s platform is an unorthodox combination of socialism and far-right social views, with a healthy dose of Zulu nationalism. The rise of MK contributed to the ANC’s loss of a majority, making inroads into the ANC’s traditional base and picking up 15% of the vote.

The fourth and final party to have picked up more than 5% of the vote is the EFF, who won 9% in 2024. Like MK, the EFF are a party that splintered off from the ANC over economic mismanagement and corruption scandals. Unlike MK, the EFF is hard-left, both socially and economically. The Communist and Black nationalist party is anti-Zionist to the extent that it is actually explicitly pro-Hamas, stating that if the EFF won the election, they would sell arms to Hamas. The EFF also supports Russia’s war against Ukraine.

So, to recap, governance failures and corruption scandals saw the ANC lose its majority in 2024, as voters faced economic grievances such as record unemployment. However, the DA retained its plurality of the vote share and was able to form a government of national unity, meaning ANC leader Cyril Ramaphosa will be President for a second term.

Meanwhile in Botswana, the Botswana Democratic Party [BDP] had been ruling for 58 years, the longest uninterrupted streak in the world. The BDP is broadly centre-right, but has consistently upheld values of economic development, democracy, and national unity above any partisan ideologies.

Diamonds were discovered in Botswana in 1967, just one year after independence. Under the leadership of the BDP, Botswana used their diamond reserves to build infrastructure and fund social welfare programs, leading to their consistent reelection. Botswana is generally considered one of Africa’s brightest spots due to its stable democratic government, its high levels of economic and social development, and its consistent good governance. Despite struggles including the global downturn in the diamond market and rising unemployment, Mokgweetsi Masisi’s BDP government was nonetheless projected to win last year’s elections yet again. But stunningly, the BDP won just 4 seats, relegating the once-dominant party to the status of fourth-largest in Botswana. How did this happen?

So Botswana uses first past the post [FPTP], the same non-proportional system as the US and the UK, to elect most of the 69 members of the National Assembly. When the BDP’s support started to decline slightly in the 90s, FPTP kept the BDP afloat because the BDP enjoyed broadly high support from across the country rather than intensive support in only specific regions. This matters because it means the BDP narrowly finished 1st in most constituencies, rather than dominating a few and finishing 2nd in the rest. Anyway, in 2024, the BDP won 30% of the vote. Under proportional representation [PR], the BDP would've won about 20 seats. But because of FPTP, the BDP only won 4 seats. This is because that trend has flipped- the BDP is now consistently finishing in second place across the country. This segues into an argument in favour of PR, which is not what I am here to discuss.

So, who stood to benefit from the decline of the BDP? Primarily the Umbrella for Democratic Change [UDC], an alliance of three centre-left to left-wing parties who united to unseat the BDP. The UDC won 36 seats, enough to establish a non-BDP government for the first time in Botswana’s history. Duma Boko, the leader of the UDC’s largest party, peacefully replaced the BDP’s Mokgweetsi Masisi as President of Botswana. Two other parties, the Botswana Congress Party and the Botswana Patriotic Front, also made inroads into the traditional hegemony enjoyed by the BDP, winning 15 and 5 seats respectively.

Although it struggles to explain such a dramatic shift, one argument is that Masisi and the BDP were primarily relying on incumbency, while the UDC promulgated exciting new policy proposals, such as more than doubling the minimum wage, improving social services, and creating a more independent judiciary. It could be the recent economic struggles, it could be the UDC’s new policy proposals, or it could just be that 58 years was enough. Either way, it can be said without a shadow of a doubt that no election more dramatically exemplifies the anti-incumbency trend of 2024’s elections as Botswana.

I said at the beginning that I had expected the South Africa and Botswana elections to be relatively similar, and that that was why I had chosen to research them. However, they were far more different than I had expected.

Firstly, Cyril Ramaphosa and the ANC stayed in government, while Mokgweetsi Masisi and the BDP were handed a debilitating defeat, leading to a wholesale change of government.

Secondly, voter turnout, which decreased consistently in South Africa, as previously mentioned, but stayed high in Botswana, clocking in at 81% in 2024.

Finally, populism and extremist politics were prominent in South Africa with the MK party [and to a lesser extent, the EFF]. But no party in Botswana seemed to be massively left or right of the centre. If I had to guess, I would attribute this to Botswana’s context. Voters may not feel they need to turn to a radical fringe party if there is a large centre-left party who has itself never been in government and is thus not to blame for the incumbent party’s shortcomings.

I had a lot of fun researching and writing this, and I hope anyone who has made it this far found it to be worth their while. Thank you for reading.

Sources

https://data.ipu.org/parliament/BW/BW-LC01/election/BW-LC01-E20241030/

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c238n5zr51yo

https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20241101-botswana-governing-party-losing-six-decade-rule-early-tallies-show

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-10-31/botswana-election-early-tallies-point-to-shock-loss-for-ruling-party

https://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/news-events/south-africas-pivotal-2024-election-maintaining-democratic-processes-and-trust-amid-digital-challenges-30-years-since-the-fall-of-apartheid/

https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/south-africas-national-assembly-re-elects-cyril-ramaphosa-president-2024-06-14/

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c8007w4vqveo

https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2023-10-23-when-we-take-over-in-2024-we-will-fund-hamas-says-malema/

https://apnews.com/article/south-africa-jacob-zuma-election-anc-party-5f2260db0b0cf4143387ea13ba8045ba

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cx2yx5nk1l0o?xtor=AL-72-%5Bpartner%5D-%5Bbbc.news.twitter%5D-%5Bheadline%5D-%5Bnews%5D-%5Bbizdev%5D-%5Bisapi%5D&at_campaign=Social_Flow&at_campaign_type=owned&at_link_id=5F2B5D36-987B-11EF-AF2F-A1C2AD3A0A2C&at_format=link&at_ptr_name=twitter&at_bbc_team=editorial&at_link_origin=BBCWorld&at_medium=social&at_link_type=web_link

In January 2024, Taiwanese people went to the polls to elect a new President and representatives in the Yuan legislature. This election was seminal in Taiwan’s future governance and position on the world stage, prompting ripple effects beyond its small territory. 2024 has become known as the ‘year of elections’ due to an immense number of significant elections across the globe, but the Taiwanese election was particularly impactful - this blog will contextualise the situation, explaining how Taiwan got here and providing further depth on its domestic and international position entering 2025.

I. Results Breakdown

The Presidency, Parliament and Public Opinion

There are two key takeaways from the way this election has unfolded: Firstly, Taiwan is another in the sweeping trend of anti-incumbency election results across the world in 2024. Secondly, contemporary Taiwan is characterised by instability in its political climate, legislative affairs and regional position.

Democratic Progressive Party candidate William Lai was elected with 40% of the vote. Of all possible results, this was the one that had the most significant foreign and domestic implications. Lai was a controversial candidate, with Chinese President Xi Jinping branding him a “troublemaker” and China’s Taiwan Affairs Office warning Taiwanese to make the “right choice” by not voting for Lai. China has taken several steps in recent years to prevent “independence plots” and the People’s Liberation Army made a record number of incursions into Taiwanese territory in 2023, in what many interpret as further attempts to deter the pro-independence candidate and those who planned to vote for him. His government is therefore very unpopular in Beijing, and among Chinese nationalists within Taiwan - more on this in sections III and IV.

The DPP continues its tenure as the governing party in Taiwan, receiving 40% of the public vote, and as a result, 51 of 113 seats. However, being the governing party doesn’t guarantee a majority, and Lai’s government will likely have difficulty pursuing a controversial pro-independence agenda with only 45% of parliamentary seats. In the previous 2020 election, the DPP received 57% of the public vote, suggesting they too have suffered from a global trend of anti-incumbent outcomes. While the DPP was not unseated, a decrease of 17% in public vote has significant implications, especially the growth in power of the Kuomintang. Taiwan’s second largest party gained 14 Yuan seats compared to the 2020 election, increasing its share to 52. The near-equal support for completely opposing parties and inability of the government to secure a majority illustrate that Taiwanese politics is becoming increasingly fractured.

II. The DPP

Taiwanese Identity and Independence

Identity is a defining factor in the DPP’s success, driving their voting traffic. After all, voting in a pro-independence party indicates that Taiwanese people support democracy and independence. These are not minor concerns for the party, given they make up the majority of its manifesto and media coverage. Independence is no small issue, either, given it concerns China and is deeply controversial. A useful comparison here is the Scottish National Party - its platform is united on the basis of independence, with Scottish nationalism representing the backbone of its political identity, and it campaigns almost exclusively on this issue. Policies surrounding the economy or social welfare might stir up controversy domestically, but do not have the same potential to trigger armed conflict or lose key international allies.

The DPP’s policy toward China, as outlined by Chairman of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, Mintong Chen, is to seek “peaceful development, equality, mutual benefits, and mutual trust.” Taiwan seeks a relationship modelled on the EU’s system of regional integration, and one that regards both countries as equals, rather than the People’s Republic of China dominating it in a more hierarchical one - the party is nationalist, but not isolationist. Despite this placative tone and vision of a positive future for cross-strait relations, the DPP’s policy platform is a non-starter - accompanying claims that Taiwan is an “independent sovereign nation” ensure Beijing refuses to acknowledge or consider it.

The previously dominant Kuomintang, the Chinese nationalist party in Taiwan’s parliament, have maintained close ties with the government in Beijing. The party has historically suppressed calls for democracy and independence, jailing several DPP leaders for their (then-radical) political views during its reign. The KMT’s role as opposition and the sheer narrowness of their seat distribution (discussed earlier) illustrate how divisive this issue still is, and the extent to which it dominates Taiwanese politics, similarly to something like Brexit in the UK, or migration and border control in the US. A year on from the election, as of February 2025, the PLA has made no major incursion into Taiwanese territory and Xi’s government has not followed through with the military threats it made to discourage Lai’s election. This could be interpreted as a signal that Beijing is not worried, and this regional intensity has cooled.

III. Domestic Tensions

Fractured parliament, the Kuomintang’s “Power Grab” and Public Unrest

At this juncture, the DPP and Lai are experiencing great difficulty governing, due to parliamentary opposition and a reduced power base. Friction when passing the national budget, in particular, has affected the party’s credibility and perceived strength. This exemplifies how the rest of the DPP legislative agenda, focused around social welfare and economic development, has suffered as a result of its strong position on independence. Because the conflict between the two parties is decades-long and even generational, the Kuomintang will likely do everything in its power to stall the independence agenda, and so far, the DPP’s apparent lack of political capital suggests it is not on the immediate horizon.

A clear attempt from the KMT to destabilise the DPP government is found in the “Contempt of Legislature” constitutional amendment in collaboration with the TPP (Taiwanese People’s Party), which increases the power of the legislature (dominated by the KMT) relative to the executive (President Lai). New powers granted to the legislature include issuing summons, access to sensitive materials, issuing fines and even imprisoning officials who “disrespect parliament.” The legislation is vague, and many in the government and wider society agree it is very open to misuse. It is interpreted as a power grab rather than a genuine push for accountability or increased checks and balances. This indicates that the DPP is not controlling Taiwan’s legislative direction or policy program, and a successful power grab has further weakened its image, but it has not happened without friction.

Citizens in particular were extremely unhappy with this legislation, and its passage culminated in the “Bluebird” protest movement organised by the Taiwan Citizen Front and the Economic Democracy Union. Thousands of citizens - including smaller parties such as the New Power Party (NPP), Taiwan Statebuilding Party, and Green Party - gathered outside the Yuan demanding the bill be scrapped because it was unconstitutional and “dismantling” Taiwan’s democracy. Mass domestic unrest could be read as yet another signal the DPP does not have the control over Taiwan it should as the ruling party, however it is also a demonstration of the public support it still enjoys, despite its difficulties in the Yuan.

Therefore, the domestic fallout from this election alone has changed the way Taiwan is governed permanently, re-distributing the balance of power between the legislature and executive, and opening the executive up to politically motivated prosecution. This will in turn change the way the governing party interacts with others in parliament, and has already affected inter-party trust and co-operative governance.

IV. The Question of China

Re-Unification, Tensions with Beijing and US Influence in East-Asia

Despite Taiwan holding democratic elections, having its own separate parliament and often operating as its own diplomatic entity, its status as a self-governing territory is heavily contested by China.

Beijing refuses to recognise the government at all, with its official government position as follows: “Whatever changes take place in Taiwan, the basic fact that there is only one China in the world and Taiwan is part of China will not change; the Chinese government’s position of upholding the one-China principle and opposing ‘Taiwan independence’ separatism, ‘two Chinas’ and ‘one China, one Taiwan’ will not change.” This argument, similar to that of Russia on the topic of Ukraine, uses culture and history to argue Taiwan should never have been independent in the first place.

However, there is another reason China would benefit from re-unification, and it is much more strategic in nature - Taiwan forms the centerpiece in the struggle for regional dominance between it and the US. Over the last few decades, Taiwan has been building an increasingly secure trade and diplomatic relationship with the United States, China’s main adversary on the world stage. According to the US State Department in 2022 the US and Taiwan enjoy a “robust unofficial relationship,” and Taiwan is “a key U.S. partner in the Indo-Pacific,” with the two states sharing “similar values, deep commercial and economic links, and strong people-to-people ties.” It is also important to mention that Taiwan has received billions of dollars worth of new weapons from Washington in the last decade, which Beijing could view as direct military provocation. A visit from US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi in 2022 ignited tensions, and Beijing responded by carrying out military drills in the strait and near-blockading Taiwan, expressing Xi and the CCP’s unhappiness with this bond.

Since Lai’s election, Beijing has severed diplomatic ties with the Taiwanese government entirely, and taken further actions to “poach” potential international allies from Taiwan, by requiring nations to choose between the two, where they invariably pick China given its status as an economic giant and long-theorised position as a threat to the “Western” or “Liberal” world order. Xi’s government has also significantly intensified its military threats toward Taiwan - toward the end of 2024, China was directing warships and planes toward Taiwan almost daily. Many Taiwanese officials suspect this is a strategy designed to “normalise” People’s Liberation Army presence. This is supported by 2023 analysis from then-CIA director William Burns suggesting President Xi had ordered the People’s Liberation Army to be ready to stage a full-scale invasion of Taiwan by 2027.

These events make it clear that Beijing takes re-unification seriously, and it is a significant foreign policy priority, given the resources and attention being directed toward it. Another key takeaway from these developments is how much influence Taiwan - and the Taiwanese government - have over global affairs, especially for such a small territory. China and the US are two of the most significant global powers, and how Taiwan will influence their relationship under the new Trump administration remains to be seen.

You can hear my commentary on this election, and enjoy around-the-world election analyses from the Backbench team, by listening to our ‘Year of Elections’ episode on Substack or Spotify.

Sources:

https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2024/12/21/2003828879

https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202409020021

https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=BEC36A4A0BB0663C&s=DC2AE73162A42D37&sms=BF821F021B282251&Create=1

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cd118zly349o

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67871587

https://www.csis.org/analysis/taiwans-2024-elections-results-and-implications

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jan/08/the-maps-that-show-how-chinas-military-is-squeezing-taiwan

https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12481

https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-taiwan/

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